"Nothing Could Be Done" | Excerpts | NASA Decision Making During Columbia's Final Flight

At approximately 9am EST on Saturday, February 1, 2003, space shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon re-entry on route to a planned landing at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The physical cause of the accident was a piece of insulating foam debris striking the orbiter during ascent thereby creating a breach in the leading edge of the left wing. Upon re-entry hot gases entered the wing resulting in extensive structural damage. The vehicle broke up and all seven crew members died.

The foam strike occurred approximately 82 seconds after liftoff on January 16, 2003. There was no clear view of the event and much uncertainty regarding the potential severity of the damage. Despite initial concerns of engineers, senior leaders dismissed the impact as a maintenance issue that would need to be repaired before the next mission. Over the next week while Columbia was on orbit, even the most vocal engineers had been persuaded by a flawed technical analysis that there was no safety-of-flight concern.

This video is a reading of excerpts from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report Volume 1, Section 6.3: Decision Making During the Flight of STS-107, published in August 2003. A full reading of Section 6.3 is also available:

NASA Decision Making During Columbia's Final Flight | Audio Reading of CAIB Report v1 §6.3
https://youtu.be/iJSsZagXfo8

The Columbia accident offered many lessons as a case study in risk management, leadership, communication, and organizational behavior. The CAIB report provided an impartial and detailed review of the events thereby creating a strong platform for discussion and learning. Edited by Ivan Myles. Source material courtesy of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA. Presented for non-commercial educational use in accordance with NASA media usage guidelines.