FAU-CMF-Finec. Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the Impact of Share Repurchases on Bondholders

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Pedro Monteiro, PhD Candidate in Finance, Florida Atlantic University:

0:08 Previous professional experience as Fixed Income Analyst
1:28 The Motivation of Research
3:46 Literature Review — Repurchase
5:18 Literature Review — Signaling Hypothesis and Wealth Transfer Hypothesis
7:01 Hypotheses 1a & 1b: Stronger shareholder governance increases signaling effects on stock buybacks or increases wealth transfer effects
8:26 Hypothesis 2: Shareholder-bondholder conflicts increase the wealth transfer effects on stock repurchase announcements
9:05 Hypothesis 3: There is stronger evidence of wealth transfer effects and weaker evidence of signaling effects when managers have their compensation tied to stock performance
9:32 Hypotheses 4 & 5: wealth transfer effects and signaling effects for bonds with non-distribution covenants and with distribution covenants
10:26 Data Sources
11:26 Shareholders governance variables: Internal governance measure and external governance measure
12:36 Bondholders governance variables — 4 categories of covenants: financing, event-driven, investment & distribution restriction
13:05 Methodology
14:38 Sample descriptive statistics
15:21 Regressions
19:43 Main Findings
20:25 Q&A

Pedro Monteiro's Google site: https://sites.google.com/view/pedromonteiro

Florida Atlantic University PhD in Finance Program: https://business.fau.edu/masters-phd/phd-program/traditional-phd/concentrations/finance/

FINEC MGIMO: https://finec.mgimo.ru/en/

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Category
Management
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